Nippon Series Managing
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Re: Nippon Series Managing
[ Author: Christopher | Posted: Oct 28, 2005 11:44 AM
| HAN Fan
]
A masterful analysis Michael. If I may I have a couple of comments and corrections.
In Game 1 the relief pitcher was Hashimoto not Takahashi (there isn't a Takahashi in the Tiger's pitching line up). Likewise Asahara is in fact Sajikihara.
The question of what Okada could do when his side does not perform is a relevant one. I think Game 4 supplies an answer. In this game he used 6 pitchers which rather kept the Marines off balance. In fact, it was only a poor shot selection by Sheets (8th inning bunt) and Yano (9th inning bunt) which allowed the shaky Marines' relief to escape. Yano's example was perhaps the worst, as not only did he squander a psychological advantage Kataoka had created over Kobayashi, but bunted into a double play putting the pressure on Fujimoto. If Okada had employed this pitching rotation in Game 1 it would have possibly been very different.
The Tigers also could have tried more to put the Marines off balance. What was interesting about Akahoshi's first stolen base (Game 3) was how ragged the fielders' throwing became when he was on base. Incidently, I seem to remember him stealing two bases in Game 4 - is this correct? Likewise the pressure placed on the Marines' relief corps and Ono in Game 4 showed that there were areas that could have been exploited.
Okada's reliance on Imaoka at third base also turned out to be a bit of a problem, especially in Game 3. I can remember writing in an earlier thread how I would like to see Kataoka at third because he was by far the better fielder and how Imaoka's errors could cost the Tigers. This turned out to be the case as in Game 3 (coupled with some abysmal umpiring). They generated momentum for an up to then stalled Marines' offense (4th inning). However, given how he had hit in the season, I can understand keeping him in the side. Perhaps I am being unfair in expecting a too big change in hindsight over the "if it isn't broken don't fix it" approach.
Changing the lineup may have worked if he had adopted the Hoshino top four (which worked against the Hawks), Imaoka, Akahoshi, Kanemoto, Hiyama (who played well), dropping Toritani to fifth and Sheets to sixth. Kataoka and Yano would have been the seventh and eighth batters. This lineup did well against the Hawks and may have made a difference. Anyway this is just speculation, but if changes were going to be made they would have had to happen after the second game. This would have been radical and difficult and would have attracted a lot of critisism if they had failed.
All in all I would say that Okada can be faulted for being too reactive, but that he was working to a successful strategy which had delivered before and he had a right to expect it to continue to deliver.
[Reworded last paragraph on Oct 28, 2005 12:04 PM, JST]
In Game 1 the relief pitcher was Hashimoto not Takahashi (there isn't a Takahashi in the Tiger's pitching line up). Likewise Asahara is in fact Sajikihara.
The question of what Okada could do when his side does not perform is a relevant one. I think Game 4 supplies an answer. In this game he used 6 pitchers which rather kept the Marines off balance. In fact, it was only a poor shot selection by Sheets (8th inning bunt) and Yano (9th inning bunt) which allowed the shaky Marines' relief to escape. Yano's example was perhaps the worst, as not only did he squander a psychological advantage Kataoka had created over Kobayashi, but bunted into a double play putting the pressure on Fujimoto. If Okada had employed this pitching rotation in Game 1 it would have possibly been very different.
The Tigers also could have tried more to put the Marines off balance. What was interesting about Akahoshi's first stolen base (Game 3) was how ragged the fielders' throwing became when he was on base. Incidently, I seem to remember him stealing two bases in Game 4 - is this correct? Likewise the pressure placed on the Marines' relief corps and Ono in Game 4 showed that there were areas that could have been exploited.
Okada's reliance on Imaoka at third base also turned out to be a bit of a problem, especially in Game 3. I can remember writing in an earlier thread how I would like to see Kataoka at third because he was by far the better fielder and how Imaoka's errors could cost the Tigers. This turned out to be the case as in Game 3 (coupled with some abysmal umpiring). They generated momentum for an up to then stalled Marines' offense (4th inning). However, given how he had hit in the season, I can understand keeping him in the side. Perhaps I am being unfair in expecting a too big change in hindsight over the "if it isn't broken don't fix it" approach.
Changing the lineup may have worked if he had adopted the Hoshino top four (which worked against the Hawks), Imaoka, Akahoshi, Kanemoto, Hiyama (who played well), dropping Toritani to fifth and Sheets to sixth. Kataoka and Yano would have been the seventh and eighth batters. This lineup did well against the Hawks and may have made a difference. Anyway this is just speculation, but if changes were going to be made they would have had to happen after the second game. This would have been radical and difficult and would have attracted a lot of critisism if they had failed.
All in all I would say that Okada can be faulted for being too reactive, but that he was working to a successful strategy which had delivered before and he had a right to expect it to continue to deliver.
[Reworded last paragraph on Oct 28, 2005 12:04 PM, JST]
Re: Nippon Series Managing
[ Author: westbaystars | Posted: Oct 29, 2005 6:50 PM
| YBS Fan
]
Thanks for catching those errors. It's good to know that someone is paying critical attention.
When writing the above piece, I kept going back and forth in thinking that Okada-kantoku wasn't reactive enough with pitching through the first three games. He should have had someone standing by just in case the one pitching change didn't work out. Why was Hashimoto left in so long in Game One? Why was Egusa left in so long in Game Two? And Fujikawa fell apart quickly in his second inning of work in Game Three. Was it because Okada-kantoku didn't have anyone else warm up until it was overwhelmingly obvious that things weren't working? I just think that somebody should have been ready. And as you point out, he seemed to be ready with relief pitchers in Game Four, and was effective.
When writing the above piece, I kept going back and forth in thinking that Okada-kantoku wasn't reactive enough with pitching through the first three games. He should have had someone standing by just in case the one pitching change didn't work out. Why was Hashimoto left in so long in Game One? Why was Egusa left in so long in Game Two? And Fujikawa fell apart quickly in his second inning of work in Game Three. Was it because Okada-kantoku didn't have anyone else warm up until it was overwhelmingly obvious that things weren't working? I just think that somebody should have been ready. And as you point out, he seemed to be ready with relief pitchers in Game Four, and was effective.
Re: Nippon Series Managing
[ Author: Christopher | Posted: Oct 29, 2005 7:40 PM
| HAN Fan
]
Very good questions and difficult to answer. Fujikawa would be the one of J and F who could pitch two innings and he hadn't given any indication that he would fail after the first inning he pitched. However, he did and the follow up should have been Williams, but Okada didn't use him. I can't explain why this happened as the Tigers could have introduced Kubota in the eigth (and he has the capacity to pitch several innings).
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First of all, the two managers had two very different ways of creating a lineup. Okada-kantoku's managing is much more mainstream in that he remained consistent with his lineup all season, and stuck with that during the Nippon Series. It's the "if it ain't broke, don't fix is" method of managing. Unfortunately, such an approach is (and was) late in reacting when something does go wrong. We'll discuss what went wrong later, for now, let's just call this the Consistency is Everything approach.
Valentine-kantoku was the complete opposite. While the Tiger lineup changed very little over the course of the season, the Marine lineup changed daily. The order of (1) Nishioka, (2) Hori, (3) Fukuura, (4) Benny, (5) Franco, (6) Satozaki, (7) Lee, (8) Saburo, and (9) Imae was used 4 times during the regular season, the most of any order. There was one order used three times, six orders used twice, and the remaining 117 games each had a unique batting order. May 25th and 26th against the Giants was the only time during the regular season that Valentine turned in the same lineup two days in a row (pitcher excluded). Can this even be considered tinkering? Or is this some new extreme form of micro-managing?
Since Okada-kantoku is probably going to get most comments, let's start with Valentine-kantoku and some of the decisions he made. Imae, the Series MVP would be a good place to start. How did Valentine-kantoku use him?
Game 1: Batted second: (1) home run, (3) infield hit, (5) RBI double, (7) lead-off hit
Game 2: Batted eighth: (2) 1-out hit, (5) lead-off hit, (6) 6th hit in row, (8) RBI hit
Game 3: Batted seventh: (2) struck out, (4) infield hit/RBI, (7) double, (7) fly out
Game 4: Batted sixth: (2) foul out, (4) sac bunt, (6) fly out, (9) fly out
Did moving Imae up and down the batting order improve his batting? Did it throw him off? Fukuuura went 2 for 4 batting behind Imae in Game 1, then was 0 for 2 (and hit by two pitches) in Game 4 hitting behind Hori and Heiuchi.
Lee was 1 for 3 (a home run) ahead of Imae in Game 2, same as when he batted #8 in Game 1. But in Game 4 Lee went 4 for 4 batting behind Imae. Was that because the Tiger pitchers were just relieved to get past Imae and let their guard down?
Four games is a very short time to try to make any sense of cause and effect. The sample space is just too small. Without Valentine-kantoku's input, it's going to be hard to know just why Imae was moved up and down the order like he was when he was producing so well (8 for 8) the first two games.
But everyone seems to agree that Okada-kantoku didn't do enough tinkering with his lineup, especially with the numbers 3, 4, and 5 batters. Number four batting Kanemoto was 0 for 10 after the first three games, poking just one hit through the right side his second at bat in Game 4. During the 2003 Nippon Series, Kanemoto hit four home runs against the Hawks, helping Hanshin win the three games at Koshien. Was it unreasonable to expect Aniki to fail so badly? Here's how the 3-5 batter did offensively:This was the heart of the Tiger lineup all season. They hit .289, .327, and .279 respectively, driving in 357 runs between them.
With the benefit of hindsight, the only move that would have helped would have been to move Yano up in the order. Toritani did fine in the number two slot, and Sheets, while below his seasonal average, did a lot better than most at number three.
The other major problem for Hanshin was Akahoshi. He only got on base five times, scoring just once. He is the Tigers' number one run maker. He did steal two bases (while Nishioka was caught stealing twice), so Akahoshi did his job when he got on. But a .200 on base percentage is a far cry from his .392 OBP during the regular season, where he scored 119 runs in 145 games. (Kanemoto had a .429 OPS and scored 120 runs in one more game.)
Akahoshi is the team catalyst. Yet, the few times Akahoshi did get on, nothing came of it. What could Okada-kantoku have done to make the relatively few good Akahoshi on-bases count? It looked to me like he relied on Kanemoto being his regular season self. Was that too much to expect?
On to pitching. The starters for the Marines went the distance the first two games. Kobayashi Hiroyuki and Serafini were both expected to go 6 innings, to which Serafini came just two outs short. All in all, the starters performed as expected, keeping the games close.
With the short series, Ono moved from starter to first middle reliever, doing the job well. Then it was down to FYK - Fujita, Yabuta, and Kobayashi Masahide. Those three combined to hold the Tigers to just one hit over the final two games, striking out 7, and walking two, while not allowing any runs. I would have to say that they performed better than Valentine-kantoku expected. One key that helped Lotte in Game 4 though was having Fujita and Yabuta throw in Game 3 despite a huge lead. That probably helped their effectiveness in holding the one run lead in Game 4.
Now on to the biggest complaint by Hanshin fans, why didn't JFK (Jeff (Williams), Fujikawa, and Kubota) get more time? Could they have stopped these runaway games?
First of all, as mentioned above, Okada-kantoku finds his pattern and sticks with it. I think I agree with many that this is not a good short-term strategy. With a limited series, Okada should be putting his best players on the field every night, there are no more series' to save them for. The typical strategy for Okada-kantoku is to only bring JFK in for winning (or occasionally tied) situations in the 7th, each pitcher throwing one inning. Did he ever have such a situation? No.
Let's go to Game 1. Igawa fell apart in the fifth inning, yet was left in there one more for good measure, giving up a total of 5 runs on 10 hits while striking out 9. Down by 4 runs in the 7th, Okada-kantoku goes with his usual holding pattern, sending in Takahashi. Takahashi gives up a pair of home runs (3-run shot by Satozaki, 2-run shot by Benny) while getting just one out before the fog gets too thick to play, so he's saved any further humiliation. Takahashi turned out to be a bad choice, but was often used to keep the Tigers in the game during the regular season - his standard use pattern. JFK are used to being used in closer games, usually with the lead. This one just wasn't one in their use pattern.
Game 2 at Chiba Marine. Andoh pitched five good innings, giving up just two unlucky runs (1 earned), holding the Marines to just three hits. Then he gives up a hit and home run in the sixth inning with one out and is done.
In comes Egusa. Again, the Tigers are down by 4 runs (4-0), so JFK aren't considered. Egusa was 4 and 3 with a 2.67 ERA during the regular season, holding 6 games and closing out 16. This is the situation Okada-kantoku has used him in all season, a situation Egusa is familiar with. There just isn't any way that Okada-kantoku could predict that Egusa would give up two home runs in this inning. Then, after a perfect 7th, throw three wild pitches to allow Ohtsuka to score from first, and Benny to take a pair of bases on a walk (Benny hustled to second on the wild pitch ball four).
The Tigers were held to just four hits in Game 2. Nobody taking over for Andoh in the sixth would have made a difference. After the sixth, it was just mop-up work, and Okada-kantoku wanted to rest his JFK relief corp for when they were needed. He was thinking like a manager who still had another series of games to play next weekend. Would it have been best to get them some exercise here? Some would say yes, others no. Who's to say which is right?
Game 3. We go to the sixth inning with the Marines taking a 3-1 lead over Shimoyanagi. Finally, Okada-kantoku realizes that he needs to resort to JFK to keep in this one. So, even though he's down by two, Okada-kantoku sends out F. Fujikawa throws a perfect sixth inning, striking out two of the three batters he faces. But he can't get an out in the seventh. An error by Toritani allows the lead-off man to reach. Imae doubles to right to put runners at second and third. Fujikawa intentionally unintentionally walks Franco to load the bases, then pinch hitter Hashimoto drives in two with a single up the middle. The Marines take a 5-1 lead, and JFK's F fails to keep the Tigers in the game.
Asahara comes in and fans the flames, pitching to 4 batters, Fukuura hitting a grand slam to put the Marines up 10-1, and Hashimoto (remember him from Game 1?) comes in to retire six of the next seven batters, putting out the fire. Nohmi throws one perfect inning, striking out two, showing that the Tigers' pen isn't completely lacking arms.
Here Okada-kantoku went with Fujikawa, one of his relief aces, and it backfired on him. Bringing in Hashimoto, who couldn't pitch his way out of the fog in Game 1, turned out to be a good move. Why was Hashimoto effective this night and not on Saturday? How could Okada-kantoku know before hand which Takahashi was going to take the mound? Yes, it's his job to know his players' conditions. But until he puts them out there, there's no telling which one he's got.
Okada-kantoku finally took the collective fans' advice in the 6th inning of Game 4. Sugiyama lasted only 3 1/3rd innings before being replaced by Nohmi, who showed he could pitch well in Game 3. Fukuhara pitched into and out of a jam in the 5th. Then was replaced by J (Jeff Williams) after retiring the first batter in the 6th. Jeff gave up a double off the top of the left-center field fence to Lee, but Lee was thrown out trying to stretch it into a triple. Next batter struck out, and J did his job.
F (Fujikawa) came in and threw two perfect innings this time. Judging by Game 3, I wouldn't have let him go out a second inning, but Okada-kantoku had faith in him, and Fujikawa bounced back well. Like Valentine-kantoku having faith in Kobayashi Masahide's ability to close despite the blowing of a 4-0 lead in Game 3 of the Second Stage of the playoffs. A manager has got to show faith in his players, and the players have got to live up to that. Fujikawa did so in Game 4.
K (Kubota) gave up a hit, but held the Marines scoreless in the 9th, keeping the game at 3-2. The JFK trio did their jobs, but the offense didn't for this final game. And that's all she wrote.
If Okada-kantoku did anything wrong with his pitching changes, it was waiting too long after a pitcher started to self destruct. He was just too slow to react. Valentine-kantoku seemed to have someone ready "just in case," but didn't have the need to resort to the bull pen in desperation. As many have pointed out on other threads, it all comes down to this one short series, so there's no need to save your ace closers. But what happens when the ace fails?
Anyway, these have been some of the thoughts I've had reading the criticisms of Okada-kantoku the past several games (and during the season at times as well). There's only so much he can do.